India’s top-15 banks earned a staggering Rs21,773 crore in commissions from selling life insurance, mutual funds and other financial products in FY23–24 — much of it by promoting schemes from their own group companies. In the case of Kotak Mahindra Bank, 100% of the life insurance commissions came from Kotak Life Insurance. Similarly, 99.1% of mutual fund commissions earned by Canara Bank came from selling Canara Robeco Asset Management Company’s (AMC) schemes. Overall, they earned as much as 25.4% of their total income from commission, exchange and broking fees in FY24.

These findings come from a report titled
The Mis-selling Menace, published by
1 Finance Magazine which highlights serious concerns around product mis-selling, excessive commissions and lack of consumer protection in India’s financial sector. The report reveals that banks earn between 2x to 11.3x more commission on life insurance policies than mutual funds — creating a strong incentive to aggressively push insurance products, often regardless of consumer need or suitability.
Among the most alarming data points is that 43.3% of all benefits paid by the top-10 life insurers are related to surrendered, withdrawn or lapsed (SWDL) policies, indicating that a significant number of customers either regretted their purchase or could not continue paying premiums. The report argues that these are not policies held for protection or long-term savings, but rather products aggressively sold to customers who may have misunderstood them or were misled about the expected returns.

The report makes a strong case that the financialisation of household savings in India is being driven less by informed consumer choice and more by aggressive cross-selling practices, particularly within banks. It documents how insurance policies are frequently bundled with bank services — such as loan disbursals, locker facilities and special savings accounts for senior citizens — with relationship managers (RMs) using privileged access to customer data to push high-commission products.
In many cases, traditional insurance plans are pitched as tax-saving investments or fixed deposits, while senior citizens are sold long-term unit linked insurance plans (ULIPs) or endowment plans that they neither need nor can afford. These tactics lead to high levels of policy discontinuation, low returns for consumers and steady revenue for banks and insurers.
The report contrasts the relative success of Securities and Exchange Board of India’s (SEBI) reforms in the mutual fund industry—which banned upfront commissions and introduced transparent direct plans—with the limited impact of insurance regulatory and development authority of India’s (IRDAI) consumer protection efforts. While SEBI implemented an all-trail commission model in 2018, life insurance distributors are still allowed to earn up to 65% of the first-year premium as commission, especially on traditional products.
Although IRDAI has introduced several initiatives — including the Bima Bharosa portal, Pre-issuance Verification Calls (PIVCs) and expense caps under the 2023 regulations — the report argues that enforcement remains weak and consumer grievances are still widespread.
The findings also expose a significant conflict of interest in how banks operate. A large share of the commissions earned on life insurance and mutual fund products come from selling products of their own group companies. According to the report, seven out of 10 banks derived over 50% of their insurance commissions from related-party insurers and six out of 10 banks did the same for mutual funds.
This vertical integration limits consumer choice and creates an environment where sales targets and incentives override fiduciary responsibility. Bank RMs, who are often the first point of contact for financial advice, are pressured to meet product targets even when the offerings are unsuitable — a practice acknowledged in the report’s survey, where over 57% of RMs said they were instructed by superiors to sell regardless of fit.
Persistency ratio — the proportion of policies still in force after a certain period — is one of the clearest indicators of product suitability. In this case, a low persistency ratio (such as only 51% of policies surviving beyond the 61st month) suggests that a large number of policyholders are either unable or unwilling to continue with their policies. Such high dropout rates suggest widespread mis-selling — whether due to misleading sales pitches, poor product understanding or the unaffordability of premiums over time. The result: policyholders lose value, while distributors walk away with hefty commissions.

These findings echo concerns that consumer forums, courts and organisations such as Moneylife Foundation have raised for years — that the mis-selling of financial products — particularly to senior citizens and first-time investors, is not just a by-product of poor financial literacy, but a systemic issue, incentivised and institutionalised within the financial system.
Yet, consumer redress mechanisms remain fragmented and mis-selling often goes unpunished. The sheer scale of the problem calls for deeper regulatory scrutiny, stronger deterrents and perhaps, as the report implies, a complete rethink of whether banks and insurers should be allowed to operate as both product manufacturers and distributors under the same corporate umbrella.